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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an improved CRTHACS
scheme for secure group communications. The scheme
resists several GCD attacks which exist in the original
CRTHACS scheme [2] and were recently reported in [1].

1. Introduction
Secure group communication (SGC) with hierarchical
access control (HAC) refers to a scenario where a group
of members is divided into different privileged subgroups
located at different levels and a high-level subgroup can receive and decrypt messages within any of its descendant
lower-level subgroups, but the converse is not allowed.
In [2], a Chinese Remainder Theorem based HAC
scheme (CRTHACS) for SGC was proposed. The scheme
was intended not only to enforce HAC but also to operate
without disclosing the hierarchy and the receivers. However, some recent attacks, presented in [1], and based on
computing certain greatest common divisors (GCDs), have
been shown to disclose the hidden hierarchy. In this paper,
we propose a solution to defeat these GCD attacks, thus
keeping the hierarchy hidden.
In sections 2 and 3, we brieﬂy summarize the CRTHACS
scheme from [2] and three kinds of GCD based attacks from
[1], respectively. We describe our solution for countering
the attacks in section 4.
 denotes public key enThroughout this paper,
cryption under key  and  secret key encryption under
key  .

2. CRTHACS for SGC
In CRTHACS there is a Group Controller (GC) and subgroups  , as well as a subgroup controller for each  ,

which will also be denoted by  . The GC has a pair of
public and private keys    , and so does each subgroup  , denoted by (   ). The GC maintains the entire
hierarchical structure of the group; generates a random set
of pairwise relatively prime numbers ¼  ½  ¾       ,
where ¼ is public, while the remaining  are secret.
There are also positive integers   , one for each subgroup
 , deﬁned by equation (2). The GC computes   and

  and sends   , 
  and  to 
by means of a secure channel. Let ½  ¾        be
the collection of all ancestral subgroups of  , and consider
below the system of congruences (1) and equation (2) which
  and   respectively.
deﬁne 

   ½    ½
   ¾    ¾

(1)
..
.

       
(2)
½  ¾    
 a six-tuple
To
every
subgroup
     ) is assigned, where
(        
 is the secret data communication key for  .  is sent
securely to the GC by  and except for  , the remaining
ﬁve elements are kept secret, known only by  . Besides
knowing its subgroup’s six elements, every participant 
has its own public and private key ( , ).
Whenever a participant  with identity  in  sends
a message , it broadcasts the tuple ( ,   ,
 )
where   is computed as:
  = 
    
  =      ¼ (3)
When a receiver  receives ( ,   ,
 ), it





can check whether the message is intended for itself, verify
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both the sender and the message, and decrypt the message
if the check and veriﬁcation succeed or discard the message
otherwise.

3. GCD based attacks
In [1], the authors put forth three possible attacks, all
based on computing a number of GCD’s, which make possible the disclosure of the hierarchy.
1. Note that  is dependent on messages, but
  is not. In particular, from the ﬁrst equation
of (3) any two instances of  will differ by a multiple
of
. Therefore from the  ’s of more than two messages of the same subgroup  , an attacker (outside  ) can
derive information about
, as 
mod
 
. Hence,   ½
 ¾  ½
 ¿  di. If the attacker has several  at his disposal
vides
he reﬁnes this information about
.
2. The subgroup  may ﬁgure out its ancestor  (i.e.,  )
by computing 
 
 since 
 
possesses
and   and can compute   .
3. If two subgroup  and  collude, they may ﬁnd their
common ancestor  (i.e.,  ) by computing  
 
 
 
 .















The solution to the three attacks can be summarized as
three modiﬁcations to the original CRTHACS scheme:
1. Move the signed MAC out of  and send the signed
MAC as a separate item. Thus,  will be independent
of messages. This will beat the attack of the ﬁrst kind.
2. Remove   and replace  with a new
 . Moreover the new  will now be computed by
to  , the
the GC. Instead of sending   and
GC just sends  to  .  uses  directly but does
. Thus, the second attack is defeated.
not know
3. Replace the public encryption of   , corresponding to its ancestral subgroup   , with a secret key encryption
 in the congruence system (1). As a result, 

cannot compute
 related to its ancestral subgroup
 because  does not know  . This defeats the third
type of attack. In fact, this modiﬁcation also defeats the second attack since    is not involved in   .
We describe the modiﬁcations in detail.
The
  and are removed from the scheme and
 is computed by the GC and sent to  directly. The
system of equations (1) is replaced by the system (4) as follows:

 






  
  
..
.

  
  





 

 







 

 
 



 

4. Improved CRTHACS

 

The ¼ ½     are as in the original CRTHACS.
Every subgroup controller  will no longer have six but
 ) and every participant
ﬁve elements: ( 
  will also have ﬁve elements ( 
 ).
Initially, the GC sends
and  to the subgroup controller  securely, and then  multicasts the two values to
all participants in its subgroup.
 , with identity  ,
Whenever participant 
sends a message  , it computes and sends ( ,
 ,   ,   ), where   
As indicated above, the
      .
  is sent as a separate item.
Assume that sender 
 . When a receiver receives ( ,  ,   ,   ), it proceeds
as follows: (1) If
 , then has the same key as
 where  is an ancestral subgroup
sender  . If
of  ,
computes   
  (i.e,
 )
and decrypts  to get
, (2)
computes  

and   
 ¼ , (3) compares  and ; if
  , the veriﬁcation of the key fails (there are two possibilities: the  was modiﬁed during transmission or
the receiver is not in the sender’s subgroup or its ancestral
subgroups). The receiver discards the message. Otherwise
(i.e.,    ), the key is correct and the message is intended
for , (4) Decrypts the   using  ’s public key
to get        ½   , where
½ stands for the decryption algorithm corresponding to
, (5) Computes       using
(which already passed the veriﬁcation in (3)), (6) Compares the above
two  s. If the two  s are equal, then both the
sender and the message are authenticated. The receiver decrypts the message using . Otherwise, the message was
modiﬁed during transmission, and the receiver discards it.
It is worth pointing out that the improved CRTHACS has
an extra advantage over the original one, viz., better efﬁciency because computing  and
will not involve
public key encryption/decryption operations.

½
¾










½
¾

(4)


 

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a solution which defeats
a number of recent attacks, satisﬁes all original goals, and
provides better performance.
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